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INTRODUCTION

T

he apartheid system of South Africa and its flagrant rejection of any
respect for the racial equality of its population have been issues of
worldwide concern for many years. As a result of this concern, the United
Nations has repeatedly issued statements condemning South Africa and
her apartheid policies and calling upon the rest of the world to take
peaceful action to force a change in those policies.'
In 1986, the United States Congress finally took action in response to
these calls by passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. 2 The
purpose of this Act is to set forth a comprehensive framework "to guide
the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to apartheid in
South Africa and lead to the establishment of a nonracial, democratic
form of government. '3 Further, the Act sets out United States policy
toward the situation in southern Africa 4 and "provides the President with
additional authority to work with other industrial democracies to help
end apartheid and establish democracy in South Africa." 5 The Act
provides for the accomplishment of these goals and policies through the
conjunctive use of two types of measures: first, measures to assist victims
of apartheid;6 and second, measures by the United States to undermine

1 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1977) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32

(1977); G.A. ies. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A19631 (1974); G.A.
Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5276 (1962); S.C. Res. 134, 15
U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1960) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4300 (1960).
2 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086
(1986)(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151, 2346(d), 5001-5116 (Supp. IV. 1986)).
3 Id. § 4, 100 Stat. 1086, 1089 (1986).
4 Id. §§ 101-10, 100 Stat. 1086, 1089-93 (1986).
5 Id. § 4, 100 Stat. 1086, 1089 (1986).
6 These would include positive actions on the part of the United States to provide
assistance to the victims of apartheid. For example, the Act calls for scholarships for the
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apartheid. 7 Although this second form of action can best be described as
economic sanctions, this description is misleading, in that:
For some sanction supporters, such as Rep. Howard Wolpe,
D-Mich., the moral and symbolic need to distance the United
States from apartheid outweighs economic rationales. "The point
is that the conflict in South Africa is not over economic issues,"
Wolpe said. "It is over the nature of a political system that totally
dehumanizes the vast majority of the population."8
It is precisely this justification for the use of sanctions that makes its
legality in the international sphere questionable. This is not to say that
apartheid should not be challenged; it is merely to say that international
law does not provide for such unilateral intervention into a country's
domestic policies in order to subject that country to the moral viewpoint
of the sanctionist. One focus of this Note, therefore, is to analyze the
international repercussions of the Anti-Apartheid Act within the context
of United States foreign policy, the sovereignty rights of South Africa, the
jurisdiction of United States courts to pass on violations of the Act, and
United Nations provisions governing interference with the economy of a
foreign government.
However, before any discussion of the international legality of this Act
can take place, its domestic legality must be determined. Therefore,
before looking to international justifications for the Act, this Note will
analyze it within the context of United States constitutional law. This
analysis will focus on several issues: the basis of authority by which
Congress can pass such an Act; the effect of the Act on the states' power
to determine where they will invest their funds; the conformity of the Act
with the established doctrines of separation of powers and delegation of
authority; and finally, the effect of the Act on the equal protection rights
of those American citizens doing business in and with South Africa.

victims, establishment of a human rights fund to aid political prisoners and detainees in
South Africa, expansion of participation in the South African economy, protection of victims
of apartheid employed by the United States, imposition of a Code of Conduct which
American companies doing business in South Africa are required to follow, and the
participation of South Africa in agricultural export credit and promotion programs. See Id.
§§ 201-12, 100 Stat. 1086, 1094-99 (1986).
7 These would include prohibitions on: importation to the United States of krugerrands,
military articles, products from parastatal organizations, uranium, coal, agricultural
products, food, iron, steel and sugar imports; exports to South Africa of computer equipment, munitions, crude oil and petroleum products; loans to the Government of South
Africa; air transportation with, and promotion of U.S. tourism in, South Africa; nuclear
trade with South Africa; new investment in South Africa; United States Government
assistance to, investment in, or subsidy for trade with South Africa; and cooperation with
the armed forces of South Africa. See Id. §§ 301-23, 100 Stat. 1086, 1099-1106 (1986).
' Green, Sanctions: From the Symbolic to the Economic, 43 CONG. Q. 445 (1985).
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II.

BACKGROUND

Economic sanctions have been defined as measures used by international bodies to uphold standards of behavior expected by custom or
required by law.9 "Sanctions are familiar conformity-defending instruments in national societies; ... in legal systems they are penalties which

designated authorities apply to law-breakers."'1 The Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act fits under this definition in that the United States
may be deemed an international body for purposes of its foreign relations
and policies. Further, the Act is being used to uphold a standard of
behavior, i.e. racial equality, in a worldwide context and to penalize
South Africa for her nonconformity to that standard. The question that
arises, however, is whether the United States may be deemed a "designated authority" for purposes of this definition. As will be shown later,
several United Nations documents call for member nations to act
unilaterally in order to achieve some specific goal.' Therefore, it is safe
to assume that the United States may be deemed a designated authority.
Having concluded that the United States is in a position to apply
sanctions, the next step is to ascertain the purpose of such application.
The commonly stated purpose of sanctions is to create a gap between the
expectations of economic well-being and actual economic reality in the
target country, causing "relative deprivation."'12 For the most part, the
Anti-Apartheid Act meets this purpose and, beyond that, seeks to achieve
the stated objectives of using economic sanctions against another country. These objectives are: 1) to deter or dissuade states from pursuing
policies which do not conform to accepted norms of international conduct;
2) to encourage compliance with these accepted norms, which are
considered to be in the general interest; 3) to apply penalties which relate
specifically to acts which the international body condemns; and 4) to
avoid unnecessary hardship in the imposition of sanctions. 13

' M. DoxEY, ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

3 (1980).

10 Id.

"1 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 35/206, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/35/L.13
(1980); G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5276 (1962).
12 See R. OLSON, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL DISpUTEs 3 (1974). This purpose, then,
serves to force the government of the target country to conform to the wishes of the

sanctionist by presenting it with the choice of complying with the sanctionist's demands or
running an increased risk of being toppled and replaced by a new government.
13 Id. at 9. It is apparent from the operation of this Act that the first three objectives are
clearly met, i.e. the stated purpose is to lead to the establishment of a nonracial, democratic
form of government in South Africa; and compliance by South Africa is in the general
interest since it would avoid conduct condemned by the international body and promote
peace in the region. However, it is doubtful whether the last objective is met. As Chief
Gatsha Buthelezi, one of black South Africa's most admired leaders, has stated: "It is
morally imperative that American firms remain active here and support us in our struggle.
A call for actual disinvestment is a call for an aggravation of exactly the conditions we are
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The bulk of apartheid legislation, which the Act seeks to deter South
Africa's Government from enforcing, has been in existence since the
Nationalist Government attained power in 1948.14 South Africa has
repeatedly defended these laws on nonracial grounds. For example,
during debates at the 1974 session of the United Nations Security
Council, R. F. Botha, South Africa's ambassador to the United Nations,
stated that:
Our policy is not based on any concepts of superiority or inferiority, but on the historical fact that different peoples differ in
their loyalties, cultures, outlooks, and modes of life and they wish
to retain them. We do have discriminatory practices and laws.
Those laws and practices are a part of the historical evolution of
our country. But I want to state here today very clearly and
condone discrimination
categorically: my government does not
15
purely on the grounds of race or color.
However, contrary to this justification for the apartheid system, a short
overview of several apartheid laws will indicate rather clearly that race
is the primary, if not the sole, justification for the system as it is today.
For instance, the Race Classification Act categorizes South Africans into
racial groups based solely on physical characteristics. 16 In other words, a
person who appears to be black will be categorized as black regardless of
his actual nationality or race. Those persons deemed to be black are then
further categorized by the Black Urban Areas Act. This Act provides that
a black person who resides in an urban area for fifteen consecutive years
becomes a permanent resident of that city. 17 The Black Labor Act,
however, requires all blacks living outside the homelands to which they
are designated to return to them every eleven months for registration,
making it virtually impossible to become a permanent resident of an
urban area.' 8
The Group Areas Act divides residential areas on the basis of race. It
requires all blacks who are not subject to full time personal supervision
by a white person to have permits to work as anything more than laborers
in a white area. This Act also provides that black persons can possess

struggling against." Chettle, The Law and Policy of Divestment of South African Stock, 15
LAw & POL'Y IN'L Bus. 445, 469 (1983). Chief Buthelezi's statement makes it clear that,
rather than meeting this last objective, the Act works directly against it by creating exactly
the hardship it portends to oppose.
"4 Gould, Black Unions in South Africa: Labor Law Reform and Apartheid, 17 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 99, 104 (1981).
J. DUGARD, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE SoUTH AFRICAN LEGAL OPDER 54 (1978).
'8 Chettle, supra note 13, at 448.
'7 Gould, supra note 14, at 105.
18 Id.
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land only under a ninety-nine year leasehold arrangement and that
homeland citizens cannot inherit property, thereby precluding any black
from owning property. 19
The Factory and Black Building Workers Act empowers the government to promulgate regulations for the separation of facilities for blacks
and whites and permits discrimination and differentiation by the President regarding sanitation, accommodations, facilities and conveniences, 20 a task already accomplished in public areas by the Separate
21
Amenities Act.
The Internal Security Act empowers the Minister of Justice to impose
disabilities on any person deemed to be engaged in activities which
22
endanger or are calculated to endanger state security or public order.
These disabilities prohibit the person from any involvement with trade
unions or any sort of gathering, defined as two or more persons together,
thereby practically immunizing that person from any social contact with
other blacks. 23
The Terrorism Act makes an individual prima facie guilty of terrorism
if he commits, attempts or incites an act which could be used by any
person intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order. 24 This
Act could be used against any labor union or practically any other
anti-apartheid faction because of the vague language involved.
The impact of these laws clearly contradicts Mr. Botha's statements
and evidences the intent of the South African Government to maintain a
system of classification based solely on race.
Until passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the
United States policy with respect to the situation in South Africa had
been one of constructive engagement. 25 However, due to the worsening
situation in South Africa, the effectiveness of this policy has deteriorated.
In 1984, violence broke out in several black townships in response to

'9 Id. at 109.
20 Id. at 110.
22 Chettle, supra note 13, at 448.
22 Gould, supra note 14, at 113.
22Id.

Id. at 115.
22 This policy of constructive engagement, though never clearly defined, has been

24

described as follows:
The Administration has been-and remains-prepared to work with the Congress
to devise measures that manifest the American people's united opposition to
apartheid-without injuring its victims. We remain ready to work with the
Congress in framing measures that.., keep the United States at arm's distance
from the South African regime, while keeping America's beneficent influence at
work bringing about constructive change within that troubled society and nation.
President's Veto Message of H.R. 4868--Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22
COMP. Pass. Doc. 1281, 1282-83 (Sept. 26, 1986). This veto was subsequently
overridden by Congress, and the Bill passed into law.
WEEKLY
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increasing rents, inferior educational facilities for blacks, and the constitutional reform which denied the black majority the right to participate
in their government. 26 The Government of South Africa responded to
these uprisings with deadly force. From September, 1984 until the
passage of this Act, some 2000 people died as a result of the violence, and
approximately 8000 people were detained during the state of emergency
imposed by the government in the eight month period from July 1985
through March 1986.27

Contributing to the violence were clashes between groups of radical
young blacks, some as young as eleven years old, known as the comrades,
and vigilante groups of older blacks, allegedly supported by the
government.2 8 In addition to these altercations, there have also been
violent battles between various black groups over ideological, political,
and tribal differences. 29 On June 12, 1986, the South African government
declared another state of emergency, in which security forces began
rounding up thousands of anti-apartheid activists, including church and
social leaders. Under this state of emergency, security forces were
stationed in the townships to "maintain calm" and were authorized to use
force to accomplish this goal. Unprecedented censorship of the press and
media has also been instituted. 30
The above-described incidents finally led Congress to take harsher
action against the South African Government in the form of economic
sanctions. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986 for the primary purpose of setting forth a framework by which the
United States could help bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and
encourage the establishment of a nonracial democratic form of government. The Act also set forth the policy of the United States toward the
Government of South Africa. 31 In addition to this policy, the Act estab-

26

S.

27

Id.

REP.

No. 370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1986).

28 Id.
29 Id. These ideological differences are between groups such as the United Democratic
Front, Azanian People's Organization, Inkatha, and various minor black groupings.
30 Id. Despite the avowed governmental purpose of stationing security forces in the
townships to maintain calm, statistics show that the average number of deaths has tripled
in 1986. These statistics prompted Bishop Desmond Tutu to comment that "Iwle have the
insensitivity of the authorities displaying their military might when they know the
presence of the troops in the townships is highly provocative." Id. It may well be that this
provocative attitude of the South African Government is what prompted Congress to
abandon the policy of constructive engagement and seek harsher measures for eradication
of the problems in South Africa.
"' This policy is geared toward bringing about reforms in the system of government to
be accomplished by encouraging the government of South Africa to1) repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice
under law for citizens of all races;
2) release... black trade union leaders and all political prisoners;
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lished measures to be taken by the United States to assist victims of
apartheid. These measures consist of scholarships for the victims of
apartheid; 32 the establishment of a human rights fund to be used for the
"direct legal and other assistance to political detainees and prisoners and
their families"; 33 expanded participation of blacks in the South African
economy; 34 the regulation of labor practices used by the United States
Government in South Africa;3 5 the purchase or lease by the United States
of residential properties within the Republic of South Africa to be made
available to victims of apartheid who are employed by the United States
Government;3 6 a prohibition on assistance to any group which grants
membership to individuals who violate the human rights of others;3 7 a
prohibition on assistance to any person or group engaging in "necklacing," the practice of execution by fire;38 and, a Code of Conduct under
which all United States nationals employing more than 25 persons in
39
South Africa are to operate.

3) permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form
political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the
political process;
4) establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws;
5) negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future
political system of South Africa; and
6) end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states.
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 101, 100 Stat. 1086, 1089
(1986). These goals are to be encouraged through economic, political, and diplomatic
measures, and U.S. action will be adjusted to reflect the progress (or lack thereof) of the
South African Government in meeting them.
32 Id. § 201, 100 Stat. 1086, 1094 (1986).
33 Id. § 202, 100 Stat. 1086, 1095 (1986).
34 Id. § 203, 100 Stat. 1086, 1095 (1986). This section declares the prohibition of South
African blacks from holding managerial, ownership and professional positions, and the
policy of confining them to the status of employees, to be an affront to the values of a free
society. This section further applauds and encourages adherence by United States nationals
to the Code of Conduct to assure assistance to black South Africans in gaining their rightful
position in the South African economy.
3 rd. § 205, 100 Stat. 1086, 1096 (1986).
36 Id. § 206, 100 Stat. 1086, 1097 (1986).
37 Id. § 209, 100 Stat. 1086, 1098 (1986).
38 Id. § 211, 100 Stat. 1086, 1098 (1986).
39 Id. §§ 207-08, 100 Stat. 1086, 1097 (1986). The Code of Conduct requires United States
nationals doing business in South Africa to:
1) desegregate the races in each employment facility;
2) provide equal employment opportunity for all employees without regard to race or
ethnic origin;
3) assure that the pay system is applied to all employees without regard to race or ethnic
origin;
4) establish a minimum wage and salary structure based on the appropriate local
minimum economic level which takes into account the needs of employees and their
families;
5) increase by appropriate means the number of persons in managerial, supervisory,
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As stated earlier, 40 prohibitions on various trade activities between the
United States and South Africa would be the primary means of accomplishing these goals and objectives. The Act, itself, provides an enforcement mechanism to insure compliance with these prohibitions. 41 Despite
the admirable goals and apparent self-sufficiency of the Act, an analysis
of its legality under both the United States Constitution and international law must be undertaken before any predictions of its effectiveness
can be made.
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Constitution provides that the "Congress shall have Power
In United States
to... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .. ,,42
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,43 the Court recognized a fundamental
difference between the powers of the federal government with respect to
foreign affairs and those with respect to domestic affairs. In support of its
theory the Court stated:
The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their
origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal
government can exercise no powers except those enumerated in

administrative, clerical and technical jobs who are disadvantaged by the apartheid system,
for the purpose of significantly increasing their representation in such jobs;
6) take reasonable steps to improve the quality of employees' lives outside the work
environment with respect to housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health; and
7) implement fair labor practices by recognizing the right of all employees, regardless of
racial or other distinctions, to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations freely and without penalty or reprisal, and recognize the right to refrain from any such
activity.
Further, these United States nationals should take reasonable steps to extend the scope
of influence on activities outside the workplace, including:
1) supporting the unrestricted rights of black businesses to locate in urban areas;
2) influencing other companies in South Africa to follow the standards of equal rights
principles;
3) supporting the freedom of mobility of black workers to seek employment opportunities
wherever they exist, and making provisions for adequate housing for families of employees
within the proximity of the workers' employment; and
4) supporting the rescission of all apartheid laws. Id.
40 See, e.g., supra note 7.
41 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 603-05, 100 Stat.
1086, 1114-15 (1986). Under these sections, the President is authorized to establish
mechanisms to monitor compliance with this Act. To ensure compliance, he is authorized to
require any person to keep full records of information relative to any act or transaction
described in the Act and conduct investigations of any possible violations of the Act. These
sections further provide for fines of $10,000-1,000,000 and prison terms of up to five years
for any violations of the Act.
42 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the
primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the
general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states
such portions as it thought desirable to vest in the federal
government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still
in the states. Since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the
mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
United States from some other source. As a result of separation
from Great Britain by the colonies acting as a unit, the powers of
external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies
and corporate
severally, but to the colonies in their collective
44
capacity as the United States of America.
This distinction in the nature and source of Congress' power over
foreign commerce set the groundwork for the basic rule that the federal
government has sole and exclusive power over foreign relations. This
groundwork has been severely tested in cases which have passed on the
the federal government and
correlative issue of division of power between
45
the states with respect to foreign affairs.
In Hines v.Davidowitz, 46 for example, the Supreme Court addressed
47
the legitimacy of a state statute requiring aliens to register annually.
In affirming the decision of the district court, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective
interests of the . . . states, is entrusted with full and exclusive

responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties. "For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but
for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign
'48
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.

Id. at 315-16.
4'The following discussion is not intended to be all-inclusive. Rather, these cases were
chosen to show some of the various justifications which the Court has stated for vesting the
foreign relations power solely in the federal government.
46 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
4

41 Id. A Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens to register was passed prior to a similar
federal statute and imposed more stringent requirements on the aliens than did the federal
statute. An alien covered by the law brought an action in federal court alleging that the
separate requirements for aliens and residents constituted an equal protection violation.
The district court enjoined enforcement of the state statute.
48 Hines, 312 U.S. at 63 (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889)).
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This statement clearly supports the rationale used by the Court in
Curtiss-Wright recognizing the distinction between the nature of the
federal power over external as opposed to internal affairs. Further
support for this position is found in the more recent case of Japan Lines
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.49 Although that case involved the taxing
power rather than the commerce power, the analysis applied by the
Supreme Court is equally applicable in both areas.50 The Supreme
Court's major concern in passing on the applicability of a state tax to an
instrument of foreign commerce was the potential impairment of "federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."51 The Court
determined that "[floreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern. 'In international relations and with respect to foreign
a
intercourse and trade, the people of the United States act through
52
single government with unified and adequate national power."'
In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied partially on the one-voice
standard first enunciated in Michelin Tire Corp. v.Wages. 53 In analyzing
the applicability of a state ad valorem property tax against tires and
tubes imported into the United States, the Michelin Tire Court concluded
that "the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs which
might affect foreign relations could not54be implemented by the states
consistently with that exclusive power."
Finally, in South-CentralTimber Development Co., Inc. v.Wunnicke 55
the Court stated the well-recognized need for a "consistent and coherent
foreign policy which is the exclusive responsibility of the federal
government."56
Taken together, all of these cases stand for the proposition that,
because of the need for a consistent and coherent statement of policy, the

49 441 U.S. 434 (1979).

'oThe case arose when the State of California imposed an ad valorem tax on plaintiffs'
containers, which happened to be located in the state on the "tax day". Plaintiff paid the tax
when imposed, then challenged its applicability to them in state court, arguing that the
containers were instruments of foreign commerce that were subject to tax in their home
ports in Japan. The trial court agreed and found for plaintiffs. However, the California
Court of Appeals reversed and was affirmed by the state Supreme Court. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
51 441 U.S. at 448.
52 Id. (quoting Board of Trustees v. United States,

289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)).
53 423 U.S. 276 (1975).
5 Id. at 285. Although this case concerned an ad valorem property tax, as did Japan
Lines, plaintiffs based their cause of action on U.S. CoNsr. art. I, sec. 10, c. 2, the
export-import clause. In enunciating the one-voice standard, the Court recognized that the
purpose of the clause was to assure that the federal government speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign goverranents.
55 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
56 Id. at 92 n.7.
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federal government must be and is the sole authority with respect to
foreign relations and policy, whether in the area of commerce or some
other area. The next issue that arises, however, is whether congressional
regulation of foreign investments, as authorized by the foreign commerce
clause, conflicts with the states' authority to invest their funds in any
venture they choose. 57 The short answer to this question is that this area
of investment involves foreign commerce more so than any sort of
investment power. Therefore, it falls mainly within an area of power
delegated exclusively to Congress rather than an area reserved to the
states. 58 A more in-depth analysis of the issue lends further support to
this conclusion since, by making investments in any market, the state
takes on the position of a market-participant, thereby subjecting itself to
the same regulation as any private citizen who would make similar
investments.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.59 the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of state participation in a specific market as a burden on
interstate commerce. 60 Hughes involved a Maryland law which was
challenged by a Virginia scrap processor on commerce clause and equal
protection grounds because it required out-of-state scrap processors to
meet more stringent requirements than in-state processors before they
could collect a bounty offered by the state. In passing on this issue, the
Court held that Maryland did not burden interstate commerce by
regulatory activity; rather, it entered the market as a participant by
offering bounties on the hulks, having the effect of encouraging, not
forcing, the in-state processing of hulks. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court looked to the intent of the framers and stated that "[w]e do not
believe the commerce clause was intended to require independent justification for such action."61
The Court addressed the same issue four years later in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake. 62 Reeves involved a challenge to the policy of a state-run cement

" The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act prohibits investment in South Africa in
general. This issue arises, however, because, by establishing a general prohibition on
investment in, or trade with, South Africa, Congress is regulating in an area of power
generally reserved to the states: the power to invest state funds.
" U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
59 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

eo Id. The Hughes case involved a Maryland law which tried to clean up the environment by removal of scrap automobiles. To encourage this, the state passed (and subse-

quently amended) a law which, in its final form, allowed for the payment of a bounty to
those processors who destroyed scrap autos upon proof of ownership. Out-of-state processors
were required to produce a title document, while in-state processors were awarded a bounty

upon production of an indemnity agreement from the supplier.
6' 426 U.S. at 809. "Such action" was defined as state participation in the market in the
same manner in which a private citizen would act.
62 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state interference with commerce permissible when state acting
as market participant).
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plant restricting sales to in-state purchasers, thus causing economic
injury to an out-of-state outfit. 63 In upholding a Court of Appeals decision

in favor of the state, the Court held that the "Commerce Clause responds
principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free trade in
the national marketplace and there is no indication of a constitutional
plan to limit the ability of states themselves to operate freely in the free
market."6
In support of this holding, the Court compared state proprietary
activities with the activities of private market participants and stated
that "state proprietary activities may be and often are burdened with the
same restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, states should similarly
share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent
limits of the Commerce Clause."6 5 Consequently, by negative implication, this language would seem to indicate that states acting in their
proprietary capacity would be subject to all federal regulations which
would apply to private market participants. Therefore, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act involves no infringement of state sovereignty
rights since, by investing its funds, the state is acting as a market
participant and is subject to the same regulation as any private citizen.
Furthermore, the states are precluded from making a Tenth Amendment/federalism argument by the theory of preemption as it arises in
cases involving both domestic and foreign commerce. For example, the
relation of this theory to domestic commerce is demonstrated by a
passage taken from Hughes v. Alexandria ScrapCorp.66 In analyzing the
role of the state as a market participant, the Court stated that "[n]othing
in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause forbids a state, in the
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others."6

7

This passage

indicates that where Congress chooses to act in a certain field, the rights
of the state, even when acting as a market participant, may validly be
limited.
The same type of preemption exists in the field of foreign commerce.

' Id. Reeves involved a cement plant run by the State of South Dakota which, during a
cement shortage, announced a plan to confine its sales to in-state purchasers. This policy
forced Reeves, an out-of-state buyer, to drastically cut production. Reeves then brought suit
in federal district court, challenging the policy. The court granted relief on the ground that
the policy violated the Commerce Clause but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground
that the state was acting in a proprietary capacity.
447 U.S. at 436-37.
65 Id. at 439.
426 U.S. 794 (1976) (theory of preemption applied to state action taken in capacity of
market participant).
"7 Id. at 810 (emphasis added).
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For example, in ContainerCorp. ofAmerica v. FranchiseTax Board,68 the
Supreme Court was faced with a case in which a state tax, imposed on the
basis of three variables, was challenged by a taxpayer on the ground that
the allocation formula led to double-taxation based mainly on differences
in labor costs between the United States and foreign countries in which
the plaintiff operated several branches. In upholding the allocation
formula, the Court distinguished between a state tax which merely had
a slight effect on foreign commerce and one which implicated foreign
affairs. Based upon this distinction, the Court went on to state that "if a
state tax merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign
affairs, we cannot infer, absent some explicit directive from Congress,that
treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical
treatment by the states."69 Despite the fact that this statement is couched
in terms of state taxes and foreign income, the underlying theory of it
may be applied to any state action which involves foreign affairs in this
manner.
In this same case, the Court went on to provide the test for exactly
when the preemption doctrine would apply. The Court concluded that "a
state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the 'one-voice'
standard if it eitherimplicates foreign policy issues which must be left to
the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive. The second
of these considerations is, of course, essentially a species of preemption
analysis."70 This statement, considered in conjunction with the analysis
set forth in the Japan Lines case, 71 leads to the conclusion that the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act is a valid exercise of congressional
power in that Congress is "explicitly directing the states to conform to a
single approach," 72 i.e. sanctions. Furthermore, state investment in a
foreign nation, or in companies doing business in a foreign nation, may be
read as "implicating foreign policy issues which must be left to the
7
Federal Government." 3
It is clear from the foregoing that the foreign commerce power is a
legitimate basis for the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act because it is an exclusive power delegated to the federal government;
it does not impose undue restriction on the states' power to regulate their
own investments since the investment power makes the state a market
participant and subjects it to federal regulations over the market; and,
finally, it satisfies the one-voice standard by creating a single statement
of policy which the United States will follow where South Africa is

463 U.S. 159 (1983).
a Id. at 194 (emphasis added).

7I Id. (emphasis supplied).
71 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

72 463 U.S. at 194.
73 Id.
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concerned. Since it has been established that the Act was passed
legitimately, the next issue which must be addressed is whether it
violates the established doctrine of separation of powers, in that regulation of foreign relations is an area predominantly governed by the
Executive Branch.
When the Constitution was originally drafted, the framers were faced
with the serious concern of preventing tyranny. The separation of powers
doctrine is the basic tool used to prevent such tyranny in that it serves to
preclude an absolute conglomeration of power in one body. 74 Therefore,

when the Constitution was drafted, certain powers were delegated to each
branch of government. However, some of the powers conferred on the
also interconnected to provide for a system of
separate branches were
75
checks and balances.
According to this structure, both the executive and the legislative
branches were afforded some authority over foreign relations. In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,7 6 the Supreme Court noted the

joint authority over foreign relations that is shared by these two
branches.
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment ... is to be avoided and success
for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be
made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
77
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.
This statement evidences the underlying idea that any congressional
legislation which is to be effectuated in the international realm must
afford the President a great degree of freedom by which to implement

74 THE FEDERALiSt No. 47 (J. Madison).

" TaE

FEDERALiSr

No. 51 (J. Madison).

299 U.S. 304 (1936).
71 Id. at 320. The Court went on to note the "unwisdom" of requiring Congress to lay
76

down narrowly defined standards by which the President is to be governed. The Court stated
that:
When the President is to be authorized by legislation to act in respect of a matter
intended to affect a situation in foreign territory, the legislator properly bears in
mind the important consideration that the form of the President's action-or,
indeed, whether he shall act at all-may well depend, among other things, upon
the nature of the confidential information which he has, or may thereafter receive,
or upon the effect which his action may have upon our foreign relations.
Id. This passage serves to show that the President's exclusive knowledge of certain matters
within the foreign sphere makes him more competent than Congress to deal in such a
foreign sphere. However, this also indicates that, to some extent, congressional legislation
is necessary before the President may act in a given area.
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such legislation. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act operates in
accordance with this idea. For example, several sections of the Act allow
the President or other high level United States officials to meet with
various African leaders. 78 Two possible interpretations for these sections
exist. First, the language may be taken as suggestions to the Executive
Branch on how to go about pursuing the policies stated in the Act,
particularly with respect to the "frontline states." 79 On the other hand,
the language may be taken as restrictions on the President's power in the
field of foreign affairs in that it dictates the method he is to follow in
implementing United States policy. 8o Arguably, it is the first interpretation of these sections of the Act which Congress intended to apply. This
assertion is supported by two reasons: first, each of the sections is
prefaced with language such as "it is the sense of the Congress

. . .";81

and

second, prior case law would support such an interpretation.
In Real v. Simon,82 the court stated that:

[A]ppellants do not cite, nor have we been able to locate, any
portion of the legislative history of the 1961 Act88 that would
indicate either an explicit or implicit intention on the part of
Congress to limit Executive attempts to respond to the Cuban
crisis. Absent clear and unequivocal evidence of such intent, we

71 See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 105, 100
Stat. 1086, 1091 (1986)("It is the sense of Congress that the President should discuss with
the governments of the African 'frontline' states the effects on them of disruptions in
transportation or other economic links through South Africa and of means of reducing those
effects."); Id. § 106(a)(2), 100 Stat. 1086, 1092 (1986) ("It is the sense of Congress that the
President... or other... United States officials should meet with the leaders of opposition
organizations of South Africa .... Furthermore, the President, in concert with the major
allies of the United States... should seek to bring together opposition political leaders with
leaders of the government of South Africa."); Id. § 109, 100 Stat. 1086, 1093 (1986) ("It is the
sense of the Senate that the United States Ambassador should promptly make a formal
request to the South African Government for the United States Ambassador to meet with
Nelson Mandela.").
" Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 105, 100 Stat. 1086,
1091-92 (1986).
80 It is the second interpretation which President Reagan chose to follow. In his message
accompanying the veto of the Act, 22 WEEKLY CorP. PRus. Doc. 1281, 1282 (Sept. 26, 1986), he
stated: "[T]he legislation... ties the hands of the President of the United States in dealing
with a gathering crisis in a critical subcontinent .... I am also vetoing the bill because it
contains provisions that infringe on the President's constitutional prerogative to articulate
the foreign policy of the United States."
1 See supra note 78.
82 510 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1975).
83 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961)(codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2161-2406 (1982)).
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are unwilling to announce a limitation on the84President's powers
to conduct the foreign affairs of this country.
A thorough review of the legislative history of the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act also discloses no intention on the part of Congress to
limit Executive attempts to respond to the South African crisis. Rather,
the history indicates an intent to provide the President with broad
discretion in dealing with the situation.85
Viewing these references to presidential authority under the Act in the
light which legislative history casts upon them, it is clear that the Act
meets the specifications stated in Curtiss-Wright:s 6 namely, it gives the
President considerable "discretion and freedom from statutory restriction" 87 and bears in mind that the form of presidential action
depends upon the effect which his action may have upon United States
foreign relations.88 Therefore, there is no separation of powers bar
against the Act since Congress granted the President broad authority
over the field of foreign relations involving South Africa, and further,
Congress merely suggested the means by which he is to implement the
policies stated in the Act itself.
Based on the conclusion that Congress has granted the President a
broad range of discretion, the next issue that logically arises is whether
the broad powers granted to the President by the Act represent an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. This issue arises in
particular with respect to those sections of the Act which authorize the
President to expand or modify the provisions of the Act. 89 In UnitedStates

84

510 F.2d at 560. The case arose on a challenge to a freeze of Cuban nationals' assets

which were held in the United States. Plaintiff, a naturalized citizen whose husband died in
Cuba, challenged the law after a treasury regulation permitted her to take only half of the
assets held in a United States account (her portion under Cuban community property law).
The district court upheld the freeze against a claim that it was an unconstitutional
deprivation of property, but the Fifth Circuit reversed.
s For example, the legislative history indicates that:
The Act would provide for the imposition of additional measures in one year if the
President determines that substantial progress has not been made in dismantling
apartheid . . . . The Act would give the President authority to negotiate
international agreements imposing measures on South Africa with other industrial democracies. The President would also be given the power to modify U.S.
measures to reflect international agreements.
S. REP. No. 370, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 2, 2 (1986).
s" See supra text accompanying note 77.
87 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
88 Id.
See also Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 105,
100 Stat. 1086, 1091 (1986).
" See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 208, 100
Stat. 1086, 1098 (1986):
c) The President may issue additional guidelines and criteria to assist persons
who are or may be subject to Section 207 in complying with the principles set forth
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9°
v. Fernandez-Pertierra
the court was faced with the issue of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch. The
court determined that "[r]ecent Supreme Court cases confirming other
aspects of the exercise of executive power in foreign affairs lend support
to this court's decision to uphold the challenged statute .... These cases
continue the long judicial tradition of sustaining the exclusive power of
the President in the sphere of international relations." 91
Furthermore, "as the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized, a
delegation of unusually extensive power to the President is not uncommon in the external realm."92 In South Puerto Rico, 9 3 the challenged
statute afforded the President extensive authority to impose surcharges
on sugar imported into the United States from the Dominican Republic.
The applicable language of the statute allowed the President to impose
"such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate under prevailing

in subsection (a) of this section. The President may, upon request, give an
advisory opinion to any person who is or may be subject to this Section as to
whether that person is subject to this section or would be considered to be in
compliance with the principles set forth in subsection (a).
d) The President may require all nationals of the United States referred to in
Section 207 to register with the United States Government.
See also Id. § 401, 100 Stat. 1086, 1107 (1986): "If the President successfully concludes an
international agreement,... he may, after such agreement enters into force with respect to
the United States, adjust, modify, or otherwise amend the measures imposed under any
provisions of Sections 301 through 310 to conform with such agreement." Although this
section also requires the approval of Congress by joint resolution, the information on which
such a resolution is to be based indicates an intent on Congress' part to give substantial
deference to the President's findings, thus making him the final authority with respect to
such action.
90 523 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Fla. 1981). This case arose when a defendant, indicted for her
participation in the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban refugees, challenged her indictment on the
ground that the applicable federal regulation was unconstitutional on its face as an
unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President.
a" Id. at 1141. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding
President's power to nullify prejudgment attachments against the government of Iran and
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and securities to transfer them to the
Federal Reserve Bank for ultimate transfer to Iran); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
(confirming executive authority to revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's
activities in foreign countries are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or
foreign policy of the United States).
9 South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl.
1964)(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936)), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965). In support of this proposition, the court stated that:
Practically every volume of the United States statutes contains one or more acts
or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of
subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to
his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than that which
has always been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs.
93 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
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circumstances." 94 Application of the above-stated Supreme Court position
to such a broad delegation of power suggests that the delegation of
authority in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, a delegation of
considerably smaller proportion, would also be upheld as a valid exercise
of congressional authority. Therefore, the delegation involved in the Act
is not so overbroad as to be rendered unconstitutional.
The final constitutional issue that must be addressed is whether this
Act violates the equal protection rights of those firms doing business in
South Africa. The equal protection problem arises because, unlike United
States-based multinationals doing business in other countries, those
doing business in South Africa must conform to a legislatively-mandated
Code of Conduct. 95 Section 207(a) of the Act requires that "[alny national
of the United States that employs more than 25 persons in South Africa
shall take the necessary steps to insure that the Code of Conduct is
implemented." 96 Moreover, the Act not only regulates corporate operations of United States nationals doing business in South Africa, it
selectively regulates with whom United States nationals may have
economic ties by prohibiting various types of trade and other activities
with South Africa. 97 A similar approach was pursued under the prior
policy of constructive engagement. This approach, however, called for the
voluntary divestment of all stock in companies doing business in South
Africa.
One authority on the divestment situation regarding South Africa
argues that a state, by divesting itself of holdings in companies on the
basis of their dealings with South Africa, denies those companies the
right to do business with a state institution in violation of the equal
protection clause. 98 A tenuous expansion of this argument would indicate
that a federal prohibition on trade with, or investment in, a particular
country would likewise be held to be a violation of the equal protection
clause. However, a relatively recent Supreme Court case supports precisely the contrary view. In New Orleans v. Dukes99 the Supreme Court
stated that it will not grant any significant review of general economic
legislation, but will uphold such legislation if it satisfies the rational
basis test. The Court will seek to determine only if the classification
adopted in the legislation conceivably could bear a rational relation to a
legitimate governmental purpose.100 The problem in applying the ratio-

94

Id.

" Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 207-08, 100 Stat.
1086, 1097 (1986). See also supra note 39.
9 Id. (emphasis added).
97 Id.
at §§ 301-23, 100 Stat. 1086, 1099-1106 (1986).
98 Chettle, supra note 13, at 526 n.391.
99 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
100

Id. at 303.
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nale of this case to the Act is that a question arises as to whether the
purpose involved herein is a legitimate governmental purpose. However,
the solution is clear. The classification adopted by the Government based
on the extent of a corporation's South African ties or its adherence to the
Code of Conduct clearly has a rational relationship to the legitimate
governmental purpose of effectuating its concept of socially-responsible
investment."" Therefore, if the governmental purpose of ending apartheid through the vehicle of corporate economic regulation can be equated
with the purpose of promoting socially responsible corporate investment,
then this latter purpose would add legitimacy to the former, at least for
purposes of the rational relation test of Dukes.
Furthermore, in Narenji v. Civiletti, 0 2 the court determined that
classifications among aliens based on nationality are consistent with due
process and equal protection if supported by a rational basis.103 The court
further stated that:
It is not the business of the courts to pass judgment on decisions
of the President in the field of foreign policy ....

Since decisions

in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers,
and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the
light of changing political and economic circumstances, such
decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either
the Legislature or the Executive rather than the Judiciary. This
very case illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices
rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional
adjudication. 104
Extending this language by analogy to the field of foreign commerce, it
becomes evident that the same rationale applies to support the conclusion
that the Act does not violate equal protection because it is a form of
classification different in very minor respects from that upheld by the

101

For a similar conclusion with respect to a state's divestment of its holding in a

corporation with South African ties, see Note, State and Municipal Governments React
Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionalityof the Divestment
Campaign, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 543 (1985).
102 617 F.2d 745 (D.C.Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
103 Id. The case arose as a challenge to a regulation passed by the Attorney General
requiring all nonimmigrant alien postsecondary students who were natives or citizens of
Iran to report to their local Immigration & Naturalization Service office and provide
information as to the maintenance of their nonimmigrant status. Each student was
required to show a passport, evidence of enrollment in school, and good standing in the
United States. Failure to comply with these requirements subjected the student to
deportation. The district court upheld the challenge by rendering the statute unconstitutional. The D.C. Circuit reversed.
104 Id. at 748.
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court in Narenji. The foregoing discussion makes clear that the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act does not violate equal protection.
Therefore, there are no constitutional barriers to the application of this
Act. The next step, then, is to determine whether the Act is legal under
international law. This determination will be made by analyzing the Act
within the context of United States foreign policy, the sovereignty rights
of South Africa, the jurisdiction of United States courts to pass on
violations of the Act and, finally, United Nations provisions governing
interference with the economy of a foreign government.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY

One reason for the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
was that it provided Congress an opportunity to express more concretely
the policy of the United States with respect to apartheid and the situation
in South Africa. The current foreign policy position of the United States
is to support and protect human rights. This policy is evidenced by its
support for United Nations calls for all countries to act in opposition to
oppression and apartheid. In South PuertoRico Sugar Co. Trading Corp.
v. United States,10 5 the court upheld a delegation of power to the
President to impose such conditions on sugar imports as he deemed
appropriate.1 0 6 In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the then
United States foreign policy with respect to the position of the Organization of American States. The court deferred to the position of the State
Department that "under the act... the United States had no other choice
but that by imposing the compensating fee the President had observed
the spirit of the Sixth Meeting . . . of the OAS within his existing

authority. ' 10 7 This reliance makes it likely that, were the validity of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act challenged, the court would defer to
the United States policy with respect to the position of the United
Nations and uphold the Act. The United Nations position is one calling on
member nations to unilaterally or collectively act to oppose apartheid. 108
Therefore, it is clear that the courts, in recognition of, and deference to,
the foreign policy of the United States would uphold the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act as a valid exercise of legislative authority.
The next aspect of this Act which must be considered in order to
determine its legality under international law is its effect on the
sovereignty of South Africa. The Act affects that sovereignty in two ways.

105 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. C1. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965). See also supra notes

92-94 and accompanying text.
'or Id.
107 334 F.2d at 632.
108 See G.A. Res. 35/206, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 48) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/35/L.13 (1980);

G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5276 (1962).
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First, the Act directly affects it by prohibiting investment in and trade
with South Africa until apartheid is dismantled, thus dictating through
trade policy exactly what internal policies that country is to follow. 0 9
Second, it indirectly affects sovereignty by requiring United States
nationals doing business in South Africa to conform to the legislative
Code of Conduct, which differs in significant respects from South African
law. Therefore, the Act seeks to change South Africa's internal policies by
compelling United States nationals to disobey South African laws.
In its Declaration on Friendly Relations,' 10 the United Nations has
defined sovereignty as follows:
All States . . . have equal rights and duties and are equal
members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature. In
particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
a) States are juridically equal;
b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other
States;
d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the
States are inviolable;
e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems;
f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with
its international obligations and to live in peace with other
States."'
It is apparent from this definition that the Act violates the sovereignty
of South Africa by obstructing South Africa's political independence and

'o9 See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(a), 100
Stat. 1086, 1103 (1986) which provides that:
This title... shall terminate if the Government of South Africa1) releases all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly
without trial and Nelson Mandela from prison;
2) repeals the state of emergency in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and
releases all detainees held under such state of emergency;
3) unbans democratic political parties and permits the free exercise by South
Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express political
opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process;
4) repeals the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and institutes
no other measures with the same purposes; and
5) agrees to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members
of the black majority without preconditions.
iie Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
"I Id.
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infringing on its right to choose and develop its political, social, economic
and cultural systems freely. However, in defense of the United States
position, the argument may be made that by failing to comply with its
international obligations and to live in peace with other States,112 South
Africa has waived its claim to protection of its sovereignty. If that
argument is accepted, the United States position under the Act is
justified, and no violation of South African sovereignty exists.
The next issue that must be considered is whether United States courts
will enforce their jurisdiction to pass on violations of the Act. This
question basically devolves to a question of comity of nations and what
effect this will have on decisions of United States courts.' 13 The Act itself
provides two mechanisms by which it is to be enforced. First, it provides
a private right of action to any United States national who, by operation
of the Act, is forced to curtail operations in South Africa against any
party who takes commercial advantage of such curtailment. 114 Second, it
provides for the imposition of criminal and civil penalties on any person,
natural or otherwise, who violates the provisions of the Act. 115 However,
before these penalties may be enforced, United States courts must have
jurisdiction over the action.
In UnitedStates v. FirstNational City Bank,1 1 6 the court was faced with
the problem of an American corporation doing business overseas being
precluded by the laws of the foreign country from complying with the
requirements of American law. 1" 7 In determining that the corporation
must comply with American law or be held in civil contempt, the court
determined that it may require a defendant to perform an act despite
repercussions abroad, provided that it has in personam jurisdiction over
the matter. 118 The court supported this proposition by stating that:

112 Such failures include, for example, South Africa's armed intervention in Namibia and

Angola.
113 Comity of nations has been defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws." BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 242 (5th ed.
1979).
114

Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 403, 100 Stat. 1086,

1107-08 (1986).
115
116

Id. § 603, 100 Stat. 1086, 1114-15 (1986).

396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).

117 Id. The case arose when Citibank was served with a subpoena duces tecum ordering
it to produce certain documents located in New York City and Frankfurt, West Germany,
regarding the transactions of a specific customer. Citibank refused to produce the documents from Frankfurt, asserting that its refusal was justified because production would

subject it to civil liability and economic loss in West Germany. The trial court adjudged
Citibank in civil contempt, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
11 396 F.2d at 900-01.
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[U]nder the principles of international law, "a state having
jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce a rule of law is not precluded
from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise
requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability
under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to
that conduct." 119
Additionally, the court recognized that federal courts must take care
not to impinge upon the perogatives and responsibilities of the political
branches of government in the area of foreign relations.120 In attempting
to reach a conclusion which would satisfactorily respect these two
considerations, the court listed several factors which should be considered
when deciding a case in which the defendant is subject to conflicting laws
elsewhere. 12' The court should consider: vital national interests of each
state; 22 the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose on the defendant;' 23 the extent to which the
required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state; 124 the
nationality of the person;125 and the extent to which enforcement by
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the
rule prescribed by that state. 26 Based on the application of each of these
considerations to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, it is likely
that, given a violation of the Act, courts of the United States would

119

396 F.2d at 901 (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECoND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW oF

nh UNITED

STATES § 39(1) (1965)).
120 id.

121 Id. at 902.
122 With respect to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, the vital national interest of

South Africa is the maintenance of its laws, regardless of their validity to the rest of the
world, while that of the United States is the promulgation of a uniform foreign policy, a
"one-voice" standard, which indicates United States support for human rights worldwide.
123 The nature of the hardship imposed by inconsistent enforcement is that the potential
defendants would not know whether they would be punished for violations of the Act,
thereby being unsure of whether they are justified in any way in breaking the laws of South
Africa.
12 The conduct involved in the Act may be deemed to take place primarily in the United
States, because it involves importation and exportation of goods, an activity which, with
respect to United States involvement, is performed predominantly in the United States.
12' The nationality of any persons involved in prosecutions or civil actions under the Act
would be American, since the Act only regulates the conduct of "United States nationals"
with respect to trade activities involving South Africa conducted in the United States, and
business activities conducted in South Africa involving adherence to the Code of Conduct.
121 Enforcement by action of either country is as likely to cause compliance with its laws
as is enforcement by the other country, as regards those companies doing business in South
Africa and their adherence to the Code of Conduct. However, the Act predominantly focuses
on United States nationals doing business in the United States and restricts their right to
trade with South Africa. Therefore, in most cases, it is highly unlikely that any South
African action would cause compliance with its laws by those specific persons regulated by
the Act.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988

23

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:261

enforce their jurisdiction and hear any cause of action brought under it,
whether it is a criminal action brought by the United States or a private
right of action brought under Section 403.127
Having concluded that under international law United States courts
would be able to enforce their jurisdiction over persons who violate the
Act, the only remaining issue is whether the Act is valid under the
various United Nations documents which govern international relations.
The United Nations Charter prohibits any member from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state. 128 The question that this provision presents in the context of
the Act is whether economic sanctions fall under the United Nations
definition of force. It has been stated by one authority that:
Gross interference with the normal intercourse which is conducted across frontiers-interference for the purpose of bringing
pressure to bear upon a state or government--constitutes
a... ground for claiming that there has been a breach of the law.
Within these categories of prohibited conduct would come ... acts
129
of economic coercion.
However, the dominant view in light of the legislative history of Article
2(4) is that the delegates present at the drafting of the Charter opposed
any broad construction of the article, and a narrow interpretation, i.e. one
excluding economic sanctions, prevails.130 The strongest evidence of this
interpretation is the fact that the San Francisco conference overwhelmingly rejected a Brazilian amendment which would have included economic coercion as prohibited conduct under Article 2(4).131 Further
support for this interpretation may be found in the fact that the United
Nations definition of aggression does not include economic aggression,
13 2
nor is there any precedent for such a finding.
Furthermore, the United Nations Charter requires all members to
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action to promote higher
living standards and universal respect for human rights without distinction as to race.' 3 3 On its face, this language authorizes any member
nation to take whatever action it deems appropriate to promote the stated
goals, and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act explicitly pursues

127 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 403, 100 Stat. 1086,
1107-08 (1986).
12' U.N. CHAMRs art. 2, para. 4.
129 Parry, DefiningEconomic Coercion in InternationalLaw, 12 Thx. INT'L L. J. 1, 3 (1977).
10 Blum, Economic Boycotts in InternationalLaw, 12 Tsx. Ibn'L L. J. 5, 10 (1977).
131
132

13

Id.
Johnson, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARv. INT'L L. J. 887, 908 (1978).
U.N. CHATeM art. 55, 56.
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these very goals. This is evident in the Code of Conduct 134 as well as in
the termination provisions for the Act.135
The United Nations specifically authorized individual state action in
opposing apartheid through two resolutions focusing specifically on the
problem. 136 In General Assembly Resolution 1761,137 the United Nations
requested member states to take action against South Africa, separately
or collectively, in protest of its apartheid policies. Further, in General
Assembly Resolution 35/206, the United Nations again called on member
nations to protest apartheid, this time appealing to them to take
unilateral action. Both of these resolutions listed the sanction measures
which the members were requested to impose against South Africa in
accordance with the objectives of the resolutions. The latter resolution
went further, however, in considering that all states should take action to
prevent transnationals within their jurisdiction from collaborating with
the racist regime in South Africa and by inviting all governments to
prevent such action. 1s Not only does the current United States action
with respect to South Africa conform to these resolutions by representing
unilateral action to protest apartheid, it imposes some of the measures
stated therein.' 3 9
The final document to be considered with respect to the Act is the
United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations. 140 This Declaration
recognizes the duty of States to "refrain in their international relations
from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed
''
against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State. 141
Along this same line, it states the principle that "no state may use or
encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to
coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the

134 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 208, 100 Stat. 1086,

1097 (1986).
135 Id. § 311, 100 Stat. 1086, 1103 (1986).
136 See G.A. Res. 35/206, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/351L.13 (1980);
G.A. Res. 1761, 167 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9, U.N. Doe. A/5276 (1962).
7 G.A. Res. 1761, 167 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5276 (1962).
138 See G.A. Res. 35/206, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 29, U.N. Doc. A135/L.13 (1980).
139 For example, both resolutions call upon members to boycott all South African goods;
refrain from exporting goods, including arms and ammunition, to South Africa; and refuse
landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa
and companies registered under the laws of South Africa. Further, the more recent
resolution calls upon members to impose these measures as well as to terminate all
government promotion of, assistance to, trade with or investment in South Africa; to
prohibit the sale of krugerrands; and to prevent collaboration by corporations and
individuals within their jurisdiction with the racist regime of South Africa.
140 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
141 Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988

25

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:261

exercise of its sovereign rights."142 When this language is applied to the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, it becomes apparent that the Act
violates the provisions of this Declaration because it is an economic
measure used to coerce South Africa to give up its sovereignty and act in
accordance with the demands of the United States.
Another aspect of the Declaration, however, is its conviction that the
principles of equal rights and self-determination constitute significant
contributions to international law. 143 It goes on to note that effective
application of this principle is of paramount importance to the promotion
of friendly relations based on a respect for the principle of sovereign
equality.144 As stated earlier, 145 it is possible to argue that South Africa
has waived its claim to protection of its sovereignty by infringing on the
sovereignty of other nations. This language, therefore, appears to authorize unilateral action by the United States for the goal of achieving equal
rights and self-determination for the people of South Africa. Finally, in
its closing statement, the Declaration states that the principles of the
Charter which are embodied in the document are basic principles of
46
international law and appeals to all states to observe these principles.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the language of the Declaration
appears to contradict itself on the issue of whether it actually authorizes
actions such as those taken by the United States in the Act. However, this
Declaration has been deemed to be the authoritative interpretation of the
United Nations Charter and to declare such economic measures to be in
violation of international law. 4 7 On the other hand, this Declaration
does not have the force of law, despite the fact that it is indicative of world
attitudes and general customary law.148 Furthermore, some authorities
take the view that, despite these provisions, economic coercion only
49
becomes illegal when the motive for its imposition becomes improper.
With respect to South Africa's position, the United States motive is
patently improper since it seeks to influence South Africa's internal
affairs. On the other hand, this motive may be deemed proper from the
point of view of the world community, especially when consideration is
given to current world opposition to the apartheid policies of South
Africa.
If one agrees with the proposition that the Declaration does not have

142
143
144

Id.
Id.
Id.

145 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
146
147

See supra note 140.
Lillich, The State of Economic Coercion Under InternationalLaw: United Nations

Norms, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 17 (1977).
148 Id. at 20-21.
" Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisai by States, 13
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the force of law and further views the motive of the United States from
the standpoint of the rest of the world, it becomes apparent that the Act
is legal under international law as set forth in the various United
Nations documents. However, one need not resort to these assumptions.
Since the Declaration states that the principles of equal rights and
self-determination are paramount to the promotion of friendly
relations, 150 it is clear that even if the Declaration were held to have the
force of law, the Act would be legal in that it seeks to promote equal
rights in South Africa and, having complied with this purpose of the
Declaration, the analysis need not proceed to the question of whether it
respects the sovereignty of South Africa.
V.

APPLICATION

Having determined that by making some relevant assumptions the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act is a legal form of action by the
United States, the only remaining question which must be addressed is
whether it will accomplish its stated objectives. The first step in answering this question is to look at the amount of trade between the two
countries, thereby determining the amount of economic interference this
Act can be expected to cause.
According to one government authority, "the United States is South
Africa's largest trading partner, buying about 15% of South Africa's
exports and supplying 19% of its imports in 1983. And U.S. businesses
are a major source of capital, accounting for about 15% of all foreign
investment in South Africa." 151 However, there are few points to which
the United States could provide pressure. While United States investment and trade are great, they are not indispensable to South Africa
since it has been diversifying its trade to become less dependent on any
one country for imports. 152 When the threat of sanctions arose, South
Africa diversified its foreign sources of supply, limiting its imports from
any one nation to 20%.153 As a result, the greatest effect that severing of
economic ties will have on South Africa is to force it to pay more and
wait longer for some goods. Though it can still obtain the goods, the psy-

150 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
151 Green, Sanctions: From the Symbolic to the Economic, 43 CONG. Q. 445, 445 (1985).
"U.S. investment is especially strong in some strategic sectors. One-half of South Africa's oil

industry, 70% of its computer industry, and one-third of its automobile industry are
controlled by U.S. firms, according to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, which
examines such issues for shareholders." Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 447.
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chological and foreign policy costs are great because the sanctions serve
to isolate South Africa from the United States, one of its few remaining
allies.154 This trade situation makes it clear that, on strictly economic
grounds, the Act will not accomplish its stated objectives because the
155
sanctions will only cause temporary relative deprivation.
The second step in answering this question is to look at a prior attempt
to impose sanctions on an African nation-the United Nations resolution
imposing sanctions against Rhodesia.'5 6 This resolution required members of the United Nations to prohibit among other things:
1) import of all commodities and products originating in Rhodesia;
2) sale or supply by their nationals from their territories of any
commodity or product to persons or bodies in Rhodesia, excepting only
medical and educational materials and foodstuffs;
3) provision of funds for investment or of any other financial or
economic resources to government commercial or industrial enterprises
in Rhodesia and the remittance of any funds to Rhodesia except for
pensions or payment for exempt items; and
4) airline companies constituted in their territories or under charter to
57
their nationals from flying to or from Rhodesia.
This resolution is similar to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
both in the sanctions it imposes and the justification for its imposition. In
both cases, the sanctions were imposed on the African nation in an effort
to bring an end to its nonconformist position with respect to the policies
of the rest of the world. However, the first conclusion that appears from
an analysis of the sanctions against Rhodesia is that, while they were the
main instrument of pressure, they did not achieve their stated goal.158
Furthermore, thorough analysis reveals that sanctions did not cause
"sustained economic stagnation or recession."59 Although they had
imposed direct strains in the form of unfavorable terms of trade and an
inability to obtain foreign capital on a large scale, further modest growth
in spite of the sanctions was still possible.' 60
The major reason that the sanctions against Rhodesia did not accomplish their goal was because "[p]olitically, the damaging effects of
relegating the Rhodesian government and its supporters to a kind of
international limbo were offset for a considerable time by the stiffened

154

Id. at 445.

155 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
156 S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1968), U.N. Doc. S/8601 (1968),
reprinted in The Situation in Southern Rhodesia, 1968 U.N.Y.B. 125, 152, U.N. Doc. 8601.
17 Id. This list is not all-inclusive. Rather, these selected provisions were chosen because
of their similarity to the provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.
Is M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 73 (1980).
159 H. STRACK, SANcnoNs: THE CASE OFRHODESIA 96 (1978).
160 DoxEY, supra note 158, at 78.
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resolve of white Rhodesians to resist international pressures and go it
alone." s ' This reason is directly applicable to any analysis of the
potential effectiveness of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act since
South Africa's inaction with respect to the United States' divestment
campaign of the past twenty years appears to validate the notion that
South Africans "will endure rather substantial economic damage before
they would ...countersanction the United States."162 Moreover, the fact

that U.S. sanctions against South Africa will not cause serious economic
damage makes it clear that white South Africans will easily resist the
sanctions and continue to operate as they have up to this point.
A further reason for doubting the effectiveness of the current United
States action is that the sanctions against Rhodesia constituted a
multilateral action which cut off a considerable number of supply sources
to that country, yet they failed to accomplish their stated purpose. The
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, on the other hand, is a unilateral
action, leaving other sources of supply available to South Africa without
requiring compliance with the United States objectives and goals. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1986 will not cause any major changes in the structure of the South
African system, thereby failing to accomplish its essential goals.
Even aside from economic perspectives, however, it is clear that the Act
will not achieve its stated purpose. The Code of Conduct enunciated in the
Act is strikingly similar to the Sullivan Principles,163 a voluntary code of
conduct to which several large U.S. multinationals doing business in
South Africa adhered but which did not accomplish their stated purpose
of ending apartheid.
Mr. Sullivan ...contends that corporate response to his "Sullivan
Principles" has improved the conditions of black workers and
their families and encouraged South African opposition to apartheid.
But that system of racial separation persists, and the South
African Government has served notice that business opposition
64
will not be allowed to undermine it.1

161 Id.

Green, supra note 151, at 446 (quoting MIT metals expert Daniel Fine).
The Sullivan Principles were drafted by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a Baptist
minister and General Motors board member. These principles called upon American
162
163

companies doing business in South Africa to undertake actions to desegregate the

workplace, improve training and promotion prospects for black workers, improve their lives
in matters such as health and schooling, support the establishment of black businesses, and
end apartheid laws. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, at 23. Although not all American companies

abided by these Principles, the number of signatories was large enough to have some effect
on apartheid policies had the South African Government chosen to listen.
14 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, at 23.
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The general tone of the South African position clearly indicates that
the use of sanctions will have no more effect on apartheid policies than
did voluntary opposition under the Sullivan Principles since, in either
case, the action represents "business opposition" which the Government
refuses to recognize.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act is a legitimate exercise of
power by Congress under the United States Constitution, with the basis
of congressional authority to legislate in this area coming from the
Foreign Commerce Clause. 166 The Act does not infringe on the power of
the President to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation, nor does it
unconstitutionally delegate any unnecessary legislative power to him.
Furthermore, the Act does not raise any equal protection problems, since
the Supreme Court will only apply a rational basis test to economic
legislation, 66 and this Act easily passes that test.
The Act is also legitimate under international law, subject of course, to
several differing interpretations. The Declaration on Friendly Relations,
the authoritative interpretation of the United Nations Charter, deems
acts of this nature to be illegal. However, there is language in the
Declaration which implicitly approves of such actions. Furthermore,
some authorities who interpret these types of actions take the view that
the action only becomes illegal when the motive behind it becomes
improper. From a worldwide point of view, the United States motive in
enforcing the Act is proper in that it seeks to aid in the resolution of one
of the major problems facing the world today.
Despite its legality under both domestic and international law, it is
clear that the Act will not accomplish its desired goals because: 1) the
insubstantial amount of trade involved prevents the Act from dealing a
severe blow to the South African economy; 2) a similar effort against an
African nation has failed in the past; and 3) it has been predicted that
South Africans will endure substantial hardship before taking any
retaliatory action against the United States or bending to its demands.
JOSEPH L. MILJAK

16 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
166 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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